This paper analyzes why China emerged stronger after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis while the Soviet Union collapsed shortly thereafter, and contrasts both with Iran’s post-revolutionary trajectory. (sources Journal of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, Archive.org, Taylor & Francis Online, Science Direct)
The central finding is that long-term regime durability depends on economic performance at least as much as ideological control. (source Taylor & Francis Online)
China preserved political authority while accelerating economic growth, whereas Iran pursued ideological enforcement and regional power ambitions while neglecting economic development. (sources Wiley, US Congressional Research Service, World Bank Group)
American corporate decisions—driven by cost reduction and shareholder profit
maximization—unintentionally enabled China’s rise by transferring manufacturing capacity, technology, and supply-chain expertise. (sources Harvard Business Review, American Economic Association, US Trade Representative)
Iran, by contrast, isolated itself through sanctions, ideological rigidity, and economic mismanagement. (sources World Bank Group, Science Direct)
The paper concludes that China’s model strengthened the state, the Soviet Union’s reforms dismantled it, and Iran’s approach is leading toward isolation, systemic weakness, and eventual regime collapse unless fundamental change occurs.
Key implications:
1. Economic strength is a prerequisite for sustained power.
2. Ideology without growth produces isolation and fragility.
3. Corporate incentives can undermine national security.
4. Engagement strategies must account for regime learning.
5. The Iranian model demonstrates the limits of repression without prosperity.
Abstract
This paper examines why the People’s Republic of China survived and strengthened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising while the Soviet Union collapsed only two years later, and why Iran has failed to translate ideological control into great-power status.
It argues that China learned from the Soviet failure, pursued economic reform without political liberalization, and benefited significantly from engagement with the United States and the broader free world.
In contrast, Iran prioritized suppressive ideology and geopolitical ambition while neglecting economic integration, leading to isolation and long-term regime
vulnerability.
Introduction
The end of the Cold War confronted authoritarian states with a crisis of legitimacy. (source Cambridge University Press)
Economic stagnation, public dissatisfaction, and ideological exhaustion forced leaders to choose between reform, repression, or collapse. (source Princeton)
The Soviet Union, China, and Iran each faced this challenge under different conditions and made fundamentally different choices. (sources Cambridge University Press, Journal of Democracy)
Their outcomes provide a comparative framework for understanding authoritarian survival and failure. (sources Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press)
The Soviet Union’s Reform Failure
In the late 1980s, Soviet leadership attempted political and economic reform
simultaneously. (source Archie Brown)
Openness weakened censorship, encouraged public criticism, and eroded party authority before economic improvements could materialize. (source JSTOR)
Economic restructuring disrupted existing systems without replacing them effectively. Living standards declined, nationalist movements intensified, and central authority collapsed. (sources Princeton, Warwick)
Political liberalization stripped the Communist Party of control faster than economic reform could stabilize society. (source Cambridge University Press)
By 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.
China’s Post-1989 Strategic Pivot
China’s leadership drew clear conclusions from its own 1989 crisis and the Soviet collapse. Political reform was identified as the primary existential risk. (source Journal of Democracy)
The response was decisive:
suppress organized dissent, preserve one-party rule, and accelerate economic reform under strict political control. (source Cambridge University Press)
Economic growth replaced ideology as the Party’s source of legitimacy. Stability, not liberalization, became the governing principle. (sources Politcs & Policy, Routledge)
Economic Growth as Political Legitimacy
China reframed the relationship between the state and society. In exchange for rising living standards, citizens were expected to accept strict limits on political participation. (source JSTOR)
Rapid growth reduced poverty, expanded employment, and delayed pressure for political reform. (source Openknowledge)
Unlike the Soviet Union, China sequenced reform carefully—control first, growth second—preserving authority during transition. (source UC PRESS)
The Role of the United States, the Free World, and Corporate Incentives
China’s strategy would not have succeeded without external engagement. (source Cambridge University Press)
Western policymakers believed economic integration would lead to liberalization. (sources US Department of State, Carter Center)
Meanwhile, American corporations viewed China as an opportunity to lower internal costs and increase shareholder returns. (source Carter Center)
Manufacturing, technology, and supply-chain expertise flowed into China. (source World Bank)
What began as outsourcing became industrial transfer. China became the manufacturing center for the world. (source American Economic Association)
The unintended result was a stronger Chinese industrial base built with American capital and market access. (source National Bureau of Economic Research)
Corporate Governance vs National Security
China’s rise exposed a structural conflict between corporate governance and national security. (source Washington University Law Review)
Public corporations optimize for shareholder value, not geopolitical outcomes. (source Harvard Business School)
Supply chains prioritized efficiency over resilience, and technology transfers ignored long-term strategic risk. (sources International Transport Forum, US Trade Representative)
China exploited this asymmetry through coordinated state strategy, while foreign firms optimized short-term profit. (sources USCC, Taylor & Francis Online)
The result strengthened a strategic competitor. (source US Department of Defense)
Iran: Ideology Without an Economy
Iran followed a fundamentally different path. (source Archive.org)
After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic government prioritized ideological control, religious legitimacy, and regional power projection over economic modernization. (sources Iran Data Portal, Congress.gov)
Political repression intensified, but economic reform stagnated. (source IMF)
Rather than integrating into global markets, Iran embraced isolation, resisted foreign investment, and accepted sanctions as the cost of ideological purity. (source UNCTAD)
Economic mismanagement, corruption, and demographic pressure eroded living standards. (source WIIW)
Unlike China, Iran failed to offer prosperity as a substitute for political freedom. (source The Gruyter Brill)
Unlike the Soviet Union, it never attempted meaningful economic restructuring. (source Swedish Institute of International Affairs)
The result has been chronic instability, capital flight, and declining legitimacy. (source Cambridge University Press)
Over time, ideology without growth has produced isolation rather than power. (source Cambridge University Press)
Iran’s pursuit of superpower status without an economic foundation has weakened the state and increased the likelihood of regime collapse. (source World Bank Group)
Comparative Outcomes
Political repression plus economic growth produced state durability and global power.
Political liberalization without economic success produced collapse.
Ideological repression without economic growth produced isolation and long-term regime fragility.
Implications for U.S.–China Relations and Beyond
U.S.–China relations will be defined by rivalry rather than convergence. (source Whitehouse National Security Strategy)
Selective decoupling will continue in critical sectors. (source US Department of Treasury)
Ideological competition will intensify as China promotes its model abroad. (source Strauss Center)
Iran’s trajectory offers a cautionary example: repression alone cannot sustain power
without economic performance. (source Taylor & Francis Online)
Conclusion
China rose because it learned from failure, sequenced reform carefully, and leveraged global capitalism without surrendering political control.
The Soviet Union collapsed by reforming politics before stabilizing its economy.
Iran pursued ideology over economics and isolated itself.
These three paths demonstrate a core rule of modern power: repression may preserve
control, but only economic strength preserves regimes.
Systems that ignore this reality ultimately weaken—and fail.
